Abstract
This thesis consists of four independent essays grouped in two parts. The first part analyzes the possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform. The second part considers some economic issues related to the tax avoidance activities. The possibility and duration of a Pareto-improving pension reform.Many countries face large problems in supporting current pay-as-you-go pension systems arising from demographic changes leading to the situation when returns on capital exceed population growth. Inefficiency arises from implicit taxation on pension contributions. In a closed economy, it is even more destructive due to its negative impact on savings and capital accumulation. Although the transition to a fully funded system is a great improvement of the economy, its implementation entails several difficulties if Pareto-efficiency is required. The first essay, “The Possibility of a Pareto Improving Pension Reform in a Heterogeneous Economy”, demonstrates that Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems nearly always exist. To demonstrate this, I classify existing theoretical results according to the type of reformed economy, the form of pension benefits, and the policy instruments used during the transition. Then, I show that intergenerational heterogeneity should no longer be considered as an obstacle when implementing Pareto-improving pension reforms. To maintain redistributive or insurance mechanisms supported by pay-as-you-go systems, I propose to replace inefficient social security with redistributive tax and transfer payments inside one generation. This would save the economy from the inefficiency related to the implicit taxes on pension contributions imposed by pay-as-you-go systems. The second essay, “Designing Optimal Pareto Improving Pension Reforms: A More Distorted Economy Can be Reformed Faster”, investigates the optimal Pareto-improving debt-financed transition from pay-as-you-go to fully funded pension systems. In particular, I examine the relationship between key parameter values characterizing the preferences, the technology and the size of the initial system, and the necessary time for a Pareto-improving transition. My finding is that a more distorted economy can be reformed faster. This result gives an additional explanation to the success of the Chilean reform, where an initial pay-as-you-go system was the largest and, at the same time, the most distorting.An Economy with Clever Tax Avoidance Providers.In the third essay “The Importance of Income Distribution for the Price of the Tax Avoidance Service”, I design a model with a clever tax avoidance provider, who maximizes a profit by setting the price for the tax avoidance services. Therefore, the price for the tax avoidance service is endogenously defined. In that setup, the change in income distribution is not less important than changes in the tax code, which together are responsible for the tax avoidance demand. The model has a wide range of applications. In particular, I analyze the relation between inequality and the collection of tax revenue. The paper shows that tax revenue as a percentage of GDP might grow with inequality when the tax code is not significantly changed. Moreover, higher inequality implies lower marginal cost of additional revenue. This assay also considers tax base broadening, providing examples where this leads to a reduction in tax revenue.In the fourth essay, “ Tax Avoidance as a Reason for Secession”, I provide an additional explanation for the intentions to secede related to expected changes in the tax codes after the ''break down of a nation''. To demonstrate my points, I use a tax avoidance model designed in the third essay, where active tax avoidance providers make a decision about the price and quantity of their services. Secession gives the avoidance provider the option of setting different prices in separate regions. As a consequence, the price for the tax avoidance service may fall in the poorer region and the elite of this region would be able to avoid the tax, which is impossible in union. Moreover, regional separation may lead to tremendous changes in the shape of income distribution, forcing new governments to change the tax codes. Thus, the government of the richer region may reduce tax rates in order to enlarge the tax revenue collection. To avoid a breakdown of the state, the government should reduce inefficient spending and tax duties. Promoting democracy or increasing the political influence of poor households may reduce the tendency to separate.