Abstract
This doctoral thesis consists of three self-contained essays on how competition has evolved over time.
The Proxy Advice Industry and Common Owners’ Coordination examines the link between ownership structure and competition. Ownership today is concentrated to large institutional investors who often hold shares in competing firms. The author shows how 70% of institutional investors use the same proxy advisor when they vote at shareholder meetings and how this leads to coordination of investors’ interests and softening of competition.
Does the Production Approach to Markup Estimation Match a Stylized Fact? explores estimation of markups, a key measure of competition. The essay provides a novel empirical assessment of the production approach to estimate markups. Comparing estimates to the stylized fact that markups are higher on more concentrated local markets, the author finds support for the usefulness of the approach.
Cartel Birth and Death Dynamics: Empirical Evidence investigates the effectiveness of antitrust regulation in countering collusion. The authors study how cartels are affected by a gradual tightening in antitrust enforcement during a time when cartels were legal. Stricter competition laws lead to fewer registered cartels but cartels continue to form undercover.