Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical argument suggesting that nonproductive activities aimed at influencing the distribution of income might increase when constitutional restrictions against redistribution are imposed or strengthened. This could come about when organized groups are able to secure such a large share of total production prior to the constitutional reform that they choose to limit the share of their resources that they allocate to influence activities, in order not to hurt their own interests. The reform would reduce the share received by organized groups at the initial level of influence activities, which in turn would lower their incentive to limit such activities. By facilitating redistribution through constitutional reform, on the other hand, countries where the initial redistributive effectiveness is relatively large could limit influence activities, thereby improving economic performance. These findings are used together with other factors, such as the share of the economy's initial resources that is controlled by organized groups and the priorities of the constitutional assembly, to analyze constitutional choice under different conditions. We find that the mechanism analyzed in this paper is an impediment to the introduction of constitutional restrictions against redistribution, particularly in countries with poorly developed democratic institutions.