Abstract
In this paper, we explore questions about the definition and constitution of expertise and experts as algorithmic technologies impact professional work. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the effects the implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on professions, focusing on law and justice. We draw on Eyal’s (2019: 26) typology of different conceptions of expertise, and analyses that disaggregate expert work at the level of tasks (Sampson, 2020), to identify “what experts do”. This allows us to examine differing degrees and forms of expertise in different facets of expert work (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005). Part of a professional logic is to “get nothing wrong”, yet the use of algorithmic technologies introduces new sources of imperfection, as well as revealing existing (human) ones. Based on the introduction of cases in law using algorithmic technologies, we propose a framework for understanding the different 2 ways algorithmic technologies do and do not reconstitute the different roles and practices of professional experts. By questioning the nature of expertise, we seek to understand the effects of algorithmic technologies on the professions in a way that transcends binary positions that proclaim either the death of the professions (e.g., Susskind and Susskind, 2015) or continuity and failed revolution (Sutton et al., 2016). By decomposing the work of experts and identifying when algorithmic technologies have or have not changed roles and practices, we develop an understanding of both the opportunities and limitations of change and the implications for current and future conceptions of experts, expertise and professions. This advances debates about augmentation and the way professional work is enabled by algorithmic technologies (Raisch and Krakowski, 2021) by revealing both the practices augmented and the implications for those practices and others that are connected to them. Our approach also allows a wider understanding of the functions and fallibilities of algorithmic technologies in the professions, and how they are contributing to the evolution of the role of experts in society. This in turn opens up questions about regulation, ethics and trust, which can be addressed through the more nuanced understanding, provided by our analysis, of the interactions between algorithmic technologies and human experts. In this sense, this paper makes the following contributions: (1) We investigate the use of AI in law and discuss concrete examples, (2) we apply Eyal’s framework to certain cases of law and justice, and (3) we reflect on the role of AI with regards to functions and fallibilities of professionals in the legal sector. The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, we introduce the conceptual framework referring to the state-of-the-art of AI and professions, law and justice as professions and the Eyal’s framework. Then, we present the methods applied, and point to illustrative case examples. In the discussion section, we summarise the findings, discuss the contributions and the study’s limitations. Finally, this paper ends with perspectives for future research.