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Why Venture Later? Incentives, Learning, and Industry Allocation in VC Funds
Working paper   Open access

Why Venture Later? Incentives, Learning, and Industry Allocation in VC Funds

Ehsan Mahdikhani
Swedish House of Finance Research Paper Series, Swedish House of Finance (SHoF)
2025-10

Abstract

Exploration-Exploitation Trade-off Moral Hazard Industry Allocation Dynamic Agency Model Venture Capital
Why do VC funds delay entry into high-uncertainty sectors? I structurally estimate a dynamic model with two frictions (an LP-GP scale wedge and a GP-entrepreneur information wedge) embedded in diffusion that separates learning from adoption. Fund-1 exploration and monitoring map into Fund-2 portfolio composition and scale. Using simulated method of moments on matched fund pairs, I find: (i) the information wedge depresses composition by killing early signals; (ii) the LP-GP wedge rations investment in hot markets, with dominance reversing in cold markets. Counterfactuals imply combined frictions reduce surplus by about $37 billion (approximately 2.8% of VC and 12% of new-sector capital). Policies targeting composition (exploration-linked carry) and state-contingent scale tilts expand investment; implemented jointly, they deliver super-additive gains.
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