Per Strömberg

Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a carbon tax back in 1991. We assemble a unique data set tracking CO2 emissions from Swedish manufacturing firms over 26 years to estimate the impact of carbon pricing on firm-level emission intensities. We estimate an emission-to-pricing elasticity of around two, with substantial heterogeneity across subsectors and firms, where higher abatement costs and tighter financial constraints are associated with lower elasticities. A simple calibration suggests that 2015 CO2 emissions from Swedish manufacturing would have been roughly 30% higher without carbon pricing. (JEL H23, Q54, Q58, G32)

Financial sector wages have increased extraordinarily over the last decades. We address two potential explanations for this increase: (1) rising demand for talent and (2) firms sharing rents with their employees. Matching administrative data of Swedish workers, which include unique measures of individual talent, with financial information on their employers, we find no evidence that talent in finance improved, neither on average nor at the top. The increase in relative finance wages is present across talent and education levels, which together can explain at most 20% of it. In contrast, rising financial sector profits that are shared with employees account for up to half of the relative wage increase. The limited labour supply response may partly be explained by the importance of early-career entry and social connections in finance. Our findings alleviate concerns about "brain drain" into finance but suggest that finance workers have captured rising rents over time.

We develop a model of private equity capturing two fundamental features of this market: the fund structure and illiquidity. A fund structure with sequential capital calls arises as an optimal solution to fund managers' (GPs) moral hazard problem but exposes investors (LPs) to illiquidity risk. Funds with more illiquidity-tolerant LPs realize higher returns, leading to different expected returns across both funds and LPs in equilibrium. GPs may inefficiently accelerate drawdowns to avoid default by LPs on capital commitments. With a secondary market for LP claims, differences in fund returns are attenuated but differences in LP returns remain. The model can rationalize several empirical findings on primary and secondary private equity markets.

We examine the role private equity (PE) sponsors play in the resolution of financial distress of portfolio companies. PE-backed firms have higher leverage and default at higher rates than other companies borrowing in leveraged loan markets. But, PE-backed firms restructure more quickly, avoid bankruptcy court more often, and liquidate less often compared to other highly leveraged firms experiencing financial distress. PE owners are also more likely to retain control post-restructuring, often by infusing capital as firms approach distress. While default frequencies are higher among PE-backed firms, PE investors appear to manage financial distress at lower cost compared to other owners.

The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its impact on the economy. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. We find that industries where private equity funds invest grow more quickly in terms of total production and employment and appear less exposed to aggregate shocks. Our robustness tests provide some evidence that is consistent with our effects being driven by our preferred channel.

Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, international sample of buyouts from 1980 to 2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross-sectional factors, suggested by traditional capital structure theories, that drive public firm leverage. Instead, variation in economy-wide credit conditions is the main determinant of leverage in buyouts. Higher deal leverage is associated with higher transaction prices and lower buyout fund returns, suggesting that acquirers overpay when access to credit is easier.

This article draws on and summarizes the findings of our earlier published article, “Private Equity and Long-run Investment: The Case of Innovation,”Journal of Finance Vol. 66 No. 2 (2011). We thank Geraldine Kim, Jodi Krakower, Sanjey Sivanesan, and especially Sarah Woolverton for assistance with this project. The World Economic Forum and Harvard Business School's Division of Research provided financial support for this research. We are grateful for helpful comments from participants at the American Economic Association, European Finance Association, NBER Summer Institute, and Western Finance Association meetings, the World Economic Forum “Global Economic Impact of Private Equity” project, and participants in various seminars, especially Bronwyn Hall, Laura Lindsey, Paul Oyer, Mark Schankerman, and John van Reenen. Many thanks also to Don Chew, Campbell Harvey and two anonymous referees, whose comments greatly improved the paper. All errors and omissions are our own.

We use an important legal event to examine the effect of managerial fiduciary duties on equity-debt conflicts. A 1991 legal ruling changed corporate directors' fiduciary duties in Delaware firms, limiting managers' incentives to take actions that favor equity over debt for distressed firms. After this, affected firms responded by increasing equity issues and investment and by reducing risk. The ruling was also followed by an increase in leverage, reduced reliance on covenants, and higher values. Fiduciary duties appear to affect equity-bondholder conflicts in a way that is economically important, has impact on ex ante capital structure choices, and affects welfare.

A long-standing controversy is whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) relieve managers from short-term pressures from public shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We examine one form of long-run activity, namely, investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. Based on 472 LBO transactions, we find no evidence that LBOs sacrifice long-term investments. LBO firm patents are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and become more concentrated in important areas of companies' innovative portfolios.