Abstract
Over a year of war since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which has involved deliberate bombing campaigns on civilian targets and infrastructure, has caused enormous losses to Ukraine’s physical capital and economy, in addition to the appalling loss of life. The country needs financial support to cover its current expenditure amounting to US$ 50 billion per year, while capital expenditure to repair damage is estimated in the range of US$ 100–250 billion. Based on the principles of building back better, reconstruction will cost in the range of US$ 750 million to US$ 1.1 billion. In comparison, the global aid budget in 2021 amounted to US$ 185 billion;1 and Ukraine’s entire gross domestic product was US$ 165–200 billion in 2021. Russia’s Central Bank assets held abroad are estimated at US$ 300 billion. Financially, there is little doubt that the European Union (EU) together with the broader coalition of Ukraine’s allies can afford to support Ukraine until victory, and to fund its post-war reconstruction. Like the historical experience of the Marshall Plan, motives of strategic self-interest alongside simple altruism make a strong case for this. However, the political will will depend crucially on how and when the war ends, on the one hand, and Ukraine’s commitment to successful reform, on the other. The prospect of EU membership is a guiding star for Ukraine with the potential to both steer the practical details and inspire the political will to travel the comprehensive reform path that lies ahead. This process is not without risks, however, and elements of economic integration should be introduced along the way in parallel with the accession negotiations.