Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir B. Asheim; Mark Voorneveld; Jörgen Weibull

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Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Working paper

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Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir B. Asheim, Mark Voorneveld and Jörgen Weibull

714

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, 714, Stockholm School of Economics (SSE)

2009

Abstract

epistemic game theory

epistemic robustness

rationalizability

closedness under rational behavior

mutual p-belief

C72

D83

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

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Title: Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior
Creators: Geir B. Asheim - University of Oslo
Mark Voorneveld - Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics
Jörgen Weibull - Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics
Publication Details: 714
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance; 714
Publisher: Stockholm School of Economics (SSE); Stockholm, Sweden
Number of pages: 16
Academic Unit: Department of Economics
Language: English
Resource Type: Working paper

Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Abstract

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Metrics

Details

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