Output list
Conference paper
An introduction to evolutionary game theory
Published 2012
Toulouse School of Economics, 2012-10-16–2012-10-16, Toulouse
Conference paper
Homo moralis - preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
Published 2012
Warwick University, 2012-05-09–2012-05-09, Warwick
Conference paper
Extreme values, choice probabilities and invariance
Published 2012
Stockholm School of Ecnomics, 2012-10-01–2012-10-01, Stockholm
Conference paper
Robust set-valued prediction in games
Published 2011
Saint Peterburg's University, 2011-06-27–2011-06-27, Saint Peterburg
Conference paper
The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
Published 1995-08-25
427, 1 - 18
Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology and Economics, 1995-08-15–1995-08-19, Wilfried Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
Nash's "mass action" interpretation of his equilibrium concept for on-cooperative games, boundedly rational players are repeatedly and randomly drawn from large populations to play the game, one population for each player position. The players are assumed to base their strategy choice on the strategies' observed "relative advantage". This note formally examines this interpretation in terms of a few classes of population dynamics based on imitative and innovative adaption, and innovative adaption with memory, respectively. Extending some results in evolutionary game theory, connections between long-run aggregate behaviour and Nash equilibrium are established.